NATO gets what it wanted – a war with Russia

On September 21st, Russian President Vladimir Putin delivered an early Christmas present to NATO. A mobilization of 300,000 reservists, calling up just over one percent of the total reserve capacity of Russia in order to bolster the forces currently engaged in the Russo-Ukrainian war theatre.

Despite the endless statements about Ukrainian battlefield success, the hyping of game-changing weapon systems, and the constant mockery or condemnation of everything Russian, Putin’s act of mobilization and accompanying address were received with a strange level of suspicion and uncertainty in Western media.

If Ukraine is destined to win a military victory with the massive support of their coalition, why should this mobilization be of any concern to NATO countries?

Putting the mobilization order aside for a moment, media outlets quickly made hay out of Putin’s statement – cherry-picking his pointed reminder of the nuclear deterrence posture of the Russian Federation and characterizing it as a direct threat to the world.

Notably, this reminder comes nearly a month after then-candidate for UK Prime Minister Liz Truss stated on August 23rd, without hesitation or apparent emotion, that she would launch a nuclear strike even if it meant “global annihilation.” It also comes after the Zaporozhye Nuclear Power Plant has been shelled on a consistent basis while being held by Russian forces.

In April of 2021, the Ukrainian ambassador to Germany suggested that Ukraine would consider building nuclear weapons if it were not admitted to NATO membership.

In the face of all this, in his address Putin repeated, again, the doctrine that his country has had with regard to the use of nuclear weapons, updated in a version signed in June 2020. In State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Field of Nuclear Deterrence, it is expressed that:

“[…] The Russian Federation considers nuclear weapons exclusively as a means of deterrence, the use of which is an extreme and necessary measure, and takes all necessary efforts to reduce the nuclear threat and prevent aggravation of interstate relations that could provoke military conflicts, including nuclear ones.”

While the Russian side has made numerous attempts to establish a post-Cold War security framework that would ensure the integrity of its Western border, and engaged in good faith in its commitments to nuclear nonproliferation, its concerns have largely been ignored. With former U.S. President Donald Trump withdrawing from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty in 2018 and the Open Skies Treaty, and the New START Treaty apparently suffering from logistical challenges in allowing inspections to take place, trust between the two biggest nuclear powers currently engaged in a very thinly veiled proxy conflict is at a dangerously low level.

With this in mind, given the historical trend of NATO expansion and the continuing supply of long-range weapons flowing from the U.S. to Ukraine, some of which have been used to launch attacks into Russia’s border areas, destroying civilian infrastructure in the process – the criteria for Russia to issue a strongly-worded reminder has long been met. From the Policy:

“[…] The main military dangers, which, depending on changes in the military-political and strategic situation, can develop into military threats to the Russian Federation (threats of aggression) and for the neutralization of which nuclear deterrence is carried out, are:

a) build-up by a potential adversary in the territories adjacent to the Russian Federation and its allies […] of groupings of general-purpose forces.”

Of course, the doctrine is perfectly well-known to the U.S. and its subordinate NATO states. And the likelihood of nuclear weapons deployment remains low, as the U.S. is not interested in spoiling its investments in Ukraine and Europe, or the bigger prize – Russia’s abundant resources – with further devastation and costly radiation.

The broader NATO military strategy in Ukraine appears to have been a methodical process of attempting to provoke an overreaction on the part of Russian leadership, to make them commit manpower into frontal assaults on Ukrainian positions, take heavy losses, and undermine the domestic population’s belief in Putin leading to his overthrow.

According to Russian Defence Minister Sergey Shoigu, to date the Russian regular force has lost just under 6,000 soldiers. According to the Donetsk People’s Militia, their losses are just over 3,000. There are no available figures for the Wagner private military group. The Ukrainians – by the calculation of the Russian Ministry of Defence – have losses of roughly 61,000. Some military analysts have suggested that is a low estimate.

While the latest available polls show approval ratings for Putin’s government have seen a percentage-point drop, public confidence appears to remain quite high. What the West remains wilfully ignorant of is that Putin is viewed within Russia as more of a moderate influence – with his latest statement he appears to have caught up to public opinion on the urgency of resisting subjugation by the NATO alliance.

With the failure of sanctions to cripple the Russian economy, whatever the NATO plan ultimately was seems to have backfired on all levels. With regard to the mobilization, despite debunked reports of Russians fleeing to the Finnish border, an examination of numerous established Russian Telegram and Twitter accounts and independent media outlets show there is apparent enthusiastic reaction to both the reserve call and the announced referendums in the breakaway areas of Eastern and Southern Ukraine. There is also ongoing vigorous public debate about how to ensure the effectiveness of the mobilization, so as not to feed U.S.-led propaganda initiatives.

While Ukraine sent their forces into a largely empty and sprawling Kharkiv region in the north, securing a public relations victory in exchange for significant casualties along the way due to long range Russian armaments, local Russian troops were reinforcing their defensive positions at strategic and natural barriers presumably in order to protect the referendums from attack. 

In response to those referendums taking place in the regions of Kherson, Zaporozhye, Donetsk and Luhansk, the G7 Leaders issued a statement denouncing the actions of the residents (the majority of whom are ethnic Russians) in choosing to participate in a voting process. Those ethnic Russian residents will, after experiencing almost nine years of Ukrainian shelling, likely choose to join the Russian Federation and live under the protection of its armed forces – denying the G7 access to most of the areas of Ukraine that historically have the highest GDP per capita. If the Russians retake the Kharkiv area, they will control the majority of the large natural gas fields in the country.

As for the G7 statement, the most intriguing part is this – a single sentence at the end: “We will stand firmly with Ukraine for as long as it takes.”

“It” seems to be an elusive and not-yet-defined condition of victory for NATO countries. As their military commanders continue to hurl Ukrainian and International Legion forces at an entrenched Russian defensive line covered by effective fire support and air defence systems, as major European economies stare down devastating self-inflicted declines, and as 300,000 more Russian soldiers make their way to the area of operations, time is running out for NATO to decide what “it” is.

For Putin, and apparently the majority of Russians, things are more clear. As the Russian President stated:

“It is our historical tradition and the destiny of our nation to stop those who are keen on global domination and threaten to split up and enslave our Motherland. Rest assured that we will do it this time as well.”

Ryan Hillier is a Moncton-based writer and musician.