Dismantling the post-war liberal world order

Tariffs are in, Ukraine is out. Which leaves a question: What to think about Trump’s foreign and economic policy?

Alain Deneault is right. Trump’s working-class supporters, disappointed by elites in Washington and New York for years, are in for a surprise. As tariffs bite, inflation will grip, recession loom, and Europe and Canada will forge new trade and defence alliances. At least, this is one way to think about the dismantling of the post-war liberal world order.

It is a struggle to make sense of today’s tariffs.

It’s a struggle to make sense of what happened in the Oval Office on February 29, when Donald Trump and J.D. Vance berated Volodymyr Zelensky as a pretext to withdraw militarily aid. More broadly, what can we make of the second Trump presidency and the reaction in Europe? One thing is clear, there is a disagreement on how the world has worked for the last 80 years.

Trump’s doctrine is to dismantle the postwar liberal consensus that tied European (and Canadian) security to the United States. A consensus that allowed post-war institutions of the International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and later, the World Trade Organization (WTO), to shape global security, trade, and economy.

Understanding the consequences of Trump’s endeavour to dismantle this is a theoretical and empirical question. It’s a theoretical question because there are various ways to think about global political economy. It’s an empirical one because Trump and his presidency are hell bent on putting their theory to the test.

In broad strokes, there are three ways to understand the post-war liberal consensus. The first is a mainstream theory. It argues that after the Second World War, American hegemony, the Washington consensus leading to free trade, globalization, and tight security integration have contributed to economic growth around the world. This rising tide has lifted all boats, and despite the externalities of capitalism and globalization, the World Order is the best we could have done. It has been a net benefit for everyone on the planet, so this theory’s proponents put it. In their view, the post-war consensus is worth defending because liberal democracies are the ones holding the line against autocracy and expansionist power in Russia and China. Without it, an unprecedented era of relative stability will end, making lives harder for everyone, including Americans.

The second is a critique from the left. Left critics argue that the United States imposed the post-war consensus after World War II and then expanded it in the 1980s and 1990s through globalization and free trade as part of an imperial project. It argues American empire has having been terrible for working people. It has hollowed out communities, increased inequality, fueled financial speculation, and crony capitalism to the detriment of everyone, especially working classes and the people in global south. It’s the critique that saw the Battle of Seattle against the WTO in 1999, and in the protests in Quebec against the Free Trade Area of the Americas in 2001. It’s the critique that led to protests in 2002 against the war in Iraq, and it is the  critique that fuels ongoing protesters against climate change and ongoing wars. The basic thesis: the U.S. became a hegemonic power, globalization has benefited the U.S. and its allies through the exponential accumulation and growth of their assets across the globe, at the expense of the world. Not least because we have come to see clearly that decades of U.S. capitalism have fueled economic growth, with material consequences for a finite planet.

The third theory, which Trump and J. D. Vance have adopted, is a new critique from the right. (Prior to Trump, most mainstream Democrats and Republicans were united in believing the first theory described above.) The right critique goes something like this: post-war American foreign and economic policy was ‘bad’ for the United States, and especially for working people in the rust belt states, in rural areas, and in areas outside of the cities dominated by liberal elites. Their argument is that the post-war liberal economic and security order has been good for the world but bad for Americans. Globalization, free trade, NATO, and all the rest was financed by the U.S., to its own detriment. The world has played the United States for a sucker, they think. It is working Americans, U.S. corporations, and Washington that have given Europe, Canada, and Latin America an economic and security free ride. After all, when the United States opened its economy to free trade with Mexico, Canada, Japan, Europe, China and the world, it devastated manufacturing in its hinterland. Trump’s proposed solution is a muscular, masculine, hegemonic United States. An imperial power willing to throw its muscle around and get what it wants. One willing to use tariffs and re-engage in a Munro doctrine of outward territorial expansion, be that in Panama, Greenland, and, if Trump is to be believed, Canada.

The mainstream theory is that US-led globalization has been beneficial for the world and the United States. The left sees a system that has not worked for the world and working people, even as it has worked for the U.S. and U.S capital. The right sees a system that has been the terrible for the U.S, especially working-class Americans in rural areas.

What to make of all this? The answer is an empirical question—whose theory is right?

From a mainstream perspective, unwinding the role of the United States as the backstop of a global economic and security order will unravel the whole complex system, with devastating consequences. Like all complex systems, when parts start to break, things can go sideways quickly. It’s unclear what will bring down the house of cards. It might be today’s first salvo of a tariff war, or war, a Bird flu pandemic, an economic crisis, or the environmental crisis, but the mainstream sees a bleak future.

From a left perspective, undoing the post-war consensus will make things worse for American consumers, while creating opportunities for the world to get along without the United States. In this analysis, Trump’s tariffs might do some good by undoing US hegemony. If the skyrocketing price of imports match the skyrocketing price of eggs, perhaps what Karl Polanyi once called a double movement of organized social movements will begin to act as a self-limiting force to Trump’s agenda.

But what if the left and the mainstream are wrong? What if Trump is on to something? What if the right critique has merit? What if American protectionism and American expansionism lead to colonial endeavours that benefit the U.S.? What if things get worse for Canada, Europe, and the World, yet better for Americans, especially its billionaire class? We’re about to find out.

Let’s hope the right is wrong, and the left is right. That is, by imposing tariffs, undoing security relations with Canada and Europe, and turning U.S. policy away from globalization, things might be worse for U.S. voters, working people, consumers, and capital, but better for everyone else. It might create opportunities for fairer trade and security relations. If all that happens, Trump’s strangle hold on U.S. democracy itself might be short-lived, as inflation and recession could focus the minds of voters in the United Sates, even as it might be too late for its hegemonic project.

But what if the right is right? Trump has imposed tariffs, and if they work the way his advisors think they will— being that the tariffs won’t hurt U.S. consumers as other countries will see their currencies devalue to compensate—then people in New Brunswick, Canada, and the rest of the world are in for big trouble. The last thing anyone needs right now is an emboldened and expansionist U.S. in search of territory, resources, and a strengthened Empire.

Daniel Tubb is an associate professor of anthropology at the University of New Brunswick.